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Abstract:
This paper develops an institutional understanding of borders.  Drawing on constitutive constructivism and theories of practical communication we argue that bordering as a process is a form of sorting through the imposition of status-functions on people and things, which alters the perception of that thing by setting it within a web of normative claims, teleologies and assumptions. Studying any border, therefore, extends to include the rule structure that constitutes it as well as the sources of that structure’s legitimacy.  Furthermore, rule structures are both restrictive and facilitative and importantly they overlap while retaining different sources of legitimacy: actors bring different constitutive perspectives on the border dependent on the particular rule structure they are drawing on in order to make legitimate claims about what that border produces.  This recognition sensitizes analysis to the interplay between different sense-making regimes and their authoritative underpinnings.  Methodologically it points researchers towards the practical and discursive methods actors use when making arguments about what a particular border can and does do.
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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to develop a ‘thin’ institutional theory of borders that can be used to understand a variety of bordering processes.  In the wake of misguided notions of globalization necessarily bringing about a ‘flat’ (Friedman, 2005), ‘deterritorialised’ (Scholte, 2000), or ‘borderless’ world (Ohmae, 1995; Strange 1996), the idea of the border has firmly reasserted itself. A major facet of border studies considers borders not as impenetrable barriers designed to keep things in or out, but rather as permeable asymmetric membranes (Hedetoft, 2003: 153) that unevenly and disproportionately channel inward and outward flows of information, goods and people. Indeed, it is this ‘categorisation’ function that has arguably led to individual borders, and associated processes, becoming crucial focal points in the study of identity, mobility and subjectivity. Identity vectors such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, religion, political affiliation, class (see Balibar, 2001: 82) and indeed non-citizenship (see Bosniak, 2006: 10) may determine the level of ease of passage across national borders that function to facilitate easy access to some, while simultaneously preventing or hindering entry to others. 

However, the study of these membrane-like borders is not necessarily confined to the territorial limits of the state, or even at other traditional points of entry such as train stations and airports.  They are thus considered to be mobile, diffuse, within and outside of the state (see Rumford, 2006; Walters, 2006; Vaughan-Williams, 2008). They are ‘dispersed a little everywhere, wherever the movement of information, people, and things is happening and is controlled’ (Balibar, 1998: 1). The diffuse, asymmetric and membrane-like character of borders brings to the fore what Balibar has further called the polysemic character of borders: the idea that they represent different things to different people (see Balibar, 2002). Furthering these ideas Rumford (2006, 2007, 2008, forthcoming) argues that ‘ordinary people’ can take part in the making of important and tangible borders through what he terms ‘borderwork’. For example the UK town of Melton Mowbray successfully achieved EU Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) status for its particular brand of pork pies. This effectively created a tangible but semi-visible non-state border around the town, outside of which pies could not be branded as Melton Mowbray. The presence of this border would not be obvious to most, while to those being bordered out it is very much visible and real. 

It thus becomes difficult to theoretically and schematically locate and describe different types of border, or forms of bordering, under the same term. To what extent, for example, is the UK state border at Dover, or at the Eurostar terminal in Paris, the same as the border around Melton Mowbray, or the Champagne region of France? They are clearly very different - the UK state border is not the same as the Melton Mowbray PGI border - yet are there common bordering processes taking place at each locality? Is it possible to describe ‘different’ borders and bordering practices in, and part of, the same field of study?   In addition, how can a useful theory of bordering be achieved, without necessarily taking into account the experiences of people at specific borders, wherever they may be?  These are the questions to be addressed in this paper.  They are a response to the general literature, but also to the recently published agenda for Critical Border Studies (CBS) put forward by a number of prominent scholars in the field (see Parker et al, 2009).  To be succinct, this agenda separates three distinct streams of possible research, arguing for a need to engage with border epistemology, border ontology, and the spatiality and temporality of borders.  If we were to adopt these categories uncritically this paper sits within the first two streams. To take a more critical stance, it will be argued that the epistemological/ontological distinction is problematic and we will put forward a constitutive constructivist approach to show why this is so.  

Therefore we will argue the following:  that bordering as a process is a form of sorting through the imposition of status-functions on people and things, which alters the perception of that thing by setting it within a web of normative claims, teleologies and assumptions. Bordering is, therefore, a practical activity, enacted by ordinary people as well as (nation) states, to make sense of and ‘do work’ in the world.  Put more formally the argument runs as follows: a) the word ‘border’ is a place holder for a number of processes; b) these processes involve the creation of institutional facts; c) institutional facts are created through speech acts; d) these institutional facts are rule governed within a certain context; and e) the legitimacy of both the speech act and the status imposed to create the institutional fact are reliant on a set of contextual background assumptions that provide sets of ‘truth conditions.’ The sum of these arguments constitute a theory of ‘borderwork, ’ defined as both an analytical sensitivity to the practices of multiple actors within the bordering process, including but not limited to states and state objectives and the concrete methods by which people draw upon, contest and create borders.  The interplay of status functions and their constitutive background assumptions form ways in which different actors participate in, initiate, legitimise, resist and breach bordering processes.  Later in this paper we will apply this schema to two distinct case studies by way of illustration.  The case studies will be used in order to explicate the processes involved, rather than as in depth investigations.
It is this last point that opens up avenues for the analysis of power in the constitution of institutional realities at the border.  The defining element of this analysis is a concern with power as both constitutive and strategic. Borders are productive: they are places where institutional facts are produced through the imposition of status-functions on people and things.  However, the creation of new institutional facts relies on a rule structure.  ‘Illegal immigrant,’ ‘terrorist suspect,’ or ‘smuggled substance‘ are not just labels: their meaning is constituted by pointing to further consequences in the rule structure they are embedded in (see Kratochwil, 1989: 27).  Therefore, studying a particular border extends to include the rule structure that constitutes it as well as the sources of that structure’s legitimacy.  Second, rule structures have a dual nature (Giddens, 1984): they are both restrictive and facilitative, and importantly they are polysemic and overlap while retaining different sources of legitimacy.  This means that agents can have different strategic perspectives on the border depending on the rule structure they are drawing on in order to make legitimate claims about what the border produces.  This recognition of overlapping rule structures with different sources of legitimacy sensitizes analysis to the interplay between sense-making regimes and their authoritative underpinnings, of which the nation-state is only one.  Also, because of the interpretive nature of rule structures it points researchers in the direction of the practical and discursive methods different actors use in order to make valid arguments about what a particular border does, or normatively what it can do.  
Consequently, this approach to bordering seeks to negate the territorial-trap (Agnew, 1994) and methodological nationalism (see Chernilo, 2006) by viewing the nation-state apparatus as one, although still important, source of legitimacy among contending sources that actors can draw upon when engaging in practical, communicative, strategic ‘borderwork’. We proceed through a number of steps.  First, we address the ambiguity of borders in more detail by focusing on how bordering is enacted by various actors. Second, we introduce and outline two specific examples that will highlight the problems being addressed in the latter half of the paper. Third, we detail ‘a bare bones mechanism’ based on John Searle’s (1995) notion of ‘status-functions’.  Following suggestions by Paasi (2009: 223) this concept is treated as an ideal type (see Rust, 2006 chapter 6 for more on the legitimacy of this move) and used as a heuristic device in order to open up avenues of understanding the border in ways not anchored to the usual articulations of territory and definitions of space.  Searle’s theory is augmented with insights from Schutz (1967), social representation theory (Howarth, 2006; Moscovici, 1984) and Kratochwil’s (1989) writings on norms. After revisiting the examples previously outlined, the conclusion presents some methodological avenues and makes a case for further investigation into regimes of legitimacy, what gives particular bordering processes ‘neustic’ force (Hare, 1952; Kratochwil, 1989: 32).
Border Thinking
Ambiguity in studying borders is due, in part, to the inherent historical and empirical contingency of borders. In other words, border scholars will often theorise one particular borderline or border area, such as the US/Mexico border, or the internal/external borders of the European Union (EU), marking them as distinct from each other, as well as distinct from other borders elsewhere. This has led some scholars to debate the possibility, desirability, and consequences of a ‘catchall’ border theory. ‘A general theory of frontiers has been a recurring intellectual temptation’, as Anderson and Bort (2001: 13) point out, ‘because boundary making seems to be a universal human activity’. Newman (2001: 137) has argued that many border studies have ‘been descriptive and case study oriented and [have] not been translated to into the construction of meaningful boundary/border theory’ (see also Paasi, forthcoming). Additionally, the progression of any general border theory is laden with the presence of different disciplinary and methodological vantage points (Anderson, 2004: 319). Some argue the construction of general border theory, and more specifically the necessary abstraction that is required, may distance the researcher from the lived experience that is deemed so crucial to the study of borders (Tatum, 2000: 96).  Such experience centred approaches move away from explanations relying on statistical data (Struver, 2004), towards an emphasis on how people construct narratives and meanings of and via the border. On this reading the border can be conceptualized as a space in which identity dynamics play out: border meanings are constructed from, but also have an influence on, the experiences of people living on or around the border. There is discursive element to bordering: meanings are given to borders in general, as well as specific borders, which change over time (Anderson, 1996: 2). 

Alternatively Paasi (1996: 10; 2005: 28) demonstrates how borders can be discursive to the extent that the ‘construction of social communities and their boundaries takes place through narratives and ‘stories’ which bind people together’. In this way the border can be reinforced through material and textual constructs such as newspapers, books, maps, drawings, paintings, songs, poems, various memorials and monuments (Ibid: 13), all of which ‘reveal and strengthen the material and symbolic elements of historical continuity in human consciousness’ (Ibid: 13). It is at the level of narratives and communication that the border ‘comes to life’ (Newman, 2006: 152). Thus Newman states ‘we often delude ourselves into believing that we are living in a borderless world when, in effect, some of our more mundane daily life practices and activities demonstrate the continued impact of the bordering process on societal norms’ (Ibid: 152). On all these readings borders are both ‘meaning-making’ and ‘meaning-carrying’ entities, forming an integral part of cultural landscapes (Donnan and Wilson, 1999: 4).

Through the idea of ‘borderwork’, Rumford (2006, 2007, 2008, forthcoming) places the heterogeneous and polysemic character of borders at the centre of border studies. Here, borderwork encapsulates the notion that ordinary people can construct, maintain, and dismantle real and tangible borders through which they can be empowered. Borderwork can take numerous guises, such as the creation of new borders like the PGI border in Melton Mowbray, or alternatively utilising traditional state borders in different ways to narrate or to connect. Crucially, Rumford (forthcoming) argues that there is no longer necessarily a consensus as to where the important borders lie. Borders will be experienced differently to the extent that they may not be necessarily recognised as a border by everyone. Certain borders will be important to some and not to others. Seeing, or seeing from, the border in this way, provides access to border processes, functions, and usages that are neglected by more conventional approaches (Cooper and Rumford, forthcoming). In this vein in the next part of the paper we offer a conceptual schema that is scalable and adaptable to empirical examples taking into account border experiences, while accepting the need for a multiperspectival border studies (see Rumford, forthcoming). We add to this perspective by producing a ‘thin’ working understanding of bordering processes that can be ‘thickened out’ in particular cases to answer Boer’s (2006: 9) call to theorise borders as functions, and address the who, how and why of border construction.
Two Preliminary Examples
Although this paper is a theoretical exploration of the underpinnings of bordering processes the following examples make clear the problems being addressed. Methodologically this paper uses examples as devices through which the process of bordering can be explored.  The examples are, therefore, not to be treated as in-depth case studies.
In keeping with the example of Melton Mowbray used by Rumford as one example of borderwork, we look at the Champagne region of France as one of our working examples. Under the auspices of the Comité Interprofessional, du Vin de Champagne produces some of the most expensive wine in the world. The accolade of producing Champagne, rather than simply sparkling wine, carries with it a sizable economic boon.  It is taken as commonsense that wine from Champagne will tick a number of boxes in taste and quality. The use of the term border may be seen as justified when talking about the demarcation of the region, as past a certain ‘border line’ wine ceases to be Champagne and is instead just plain old sparkling wine.  It is possible, however, to imagine a blind taste test whereby a wine produced outside of the region is seen as better Champagne – that is, by the criteria Champagne is usually judged.  However, this does not make it Champagne.  Why not?  It tastes the same, it looks the same, and it comes in the same type of bottle.  The same Méthode Champenoise has been used. It will be argued that what makes the wine Champagne is the relationship between a speech act that invoke the very real and tangible border around the Champagne region, and a number of background assumptions for the act to have its perlocutionary effect.
The second example concerns a more ‘traditional’ border. The French port town of Calais has become synonymous with (illegal) migration of late, situated as it is close to major international transport hubs such as the Eurostar and Eurotunnel terminals, the entrance to the Channel Tunnel itself, and the ferry port. After the closure of the Red Cross Centre near Sangatte, Calais has become home to a number of ‘illegal camps’, in which the sans papiers can shelter until an opportunity arises to enter the UK. This has resulted in increased state securitization of the border, including the presence of ‘juxtaposed borders’: the UK border being located in Calais and the French border being located at Dover and St Pancras train station in London. Such securitization has arguably been in response to British popular press depictions of the UK border as ineffectual.   However Calais has also become home to different non-state actors ranging from medical groups, human rights organisations, local charities, as well as the migrants themselves, the actions of which have transformed Calais from a low key port town to a major border area. What is of interest here is the way in which non-state actors have imposed their own narrations in ways that may be detrimental to both the UK and France (see Rumford, forthcoming; Cooper and Rumford, forthcoming). 
Status-functions
Searle’s (1995) work on social reality seeks to answer a fundamental question about the nature of social facts.  In his words: ‘there are portions of the real world, objective facts in the world, that are only facts by human agreement’ (ibid: 1).  His question is then, how can these intersubjective ideas take the semblance of objective fact.  Things like money, marriages, taxes and national identity are objective in the sense that they are independent of our preferences, moral or otherwise. But they would not exist without what Searle terms collective intentionality.  On his view the existence of an objective reality of brute facts is taken as given, and it is upon these brute facts that status-functions are imposed in order to create rule governed institutional facts.  

Two points are important here: 1) material objects have no function other than that which is imposed on it by conscious observers and 2) the imposition of the function is not intrinsic to the material object (ibid: 14).  In other words things in the world only have the function we ascribe to them and the ascription of function is not necessarily dependent on the physical attributes of the material thing. A useful example is that of a river.  A river is a brute fact but we can also impose a function on that river by situating some of its attributes within a set of value judgements.  Suppose there is a village on one side of the river, and they have a difficult relationship with our village on this side.  Now, because the river is deep, it has a current, the banks are steep, it prevents people from the other village from entering our village. The physical attributes of the river coincide with a function (keeping people from the other village out) and as a result the river acquires, through the collective intentions of the village, the function of a border for the village.  It designates where it is safe to go and what land belongs to whom, and acts as a symbolic marker of the land claimed by the village.  Now the river has a status-function, but note that nothing about the river has changed: it gains its border-ness from the imposition of the function of stopping people from the other village getting into our village.  

This example can be developed further in two ways.  First, the river may dry up, losing the physical attributes that make it a good boundary.  However, this does not mean that the riverbed stops being a border as the people from the village could still act towards the riverbed in the same way as they have now developed a set of capacities towards it.  The nature of the institution has changed.  It now functions as a border not because of its physicality but because people accept the dry riverbed as having a certain status. Using Searle’s constitutive formula we can say that the riverbed (x) counts as a border (y) in the context of our village (c).  The second point is that the function of a material object is always imposed within a context and it is this that provides the truth conditions for the institution. So in some contexts the river will be a border, when it is between the two villages, but in other contexts, for example further upstream it may not, or it may be a different border for different villages. Or indeed, it may just be a good place to swim and catch fish for weary travellers.  So, the imposed function of a brute fact is always relative to the viewer and gets its meaning from the contextual background the viewer can place the ‘border’ in. For the weary traveller the function of the river is to cool feet and fill water bottles.  
This is an important point as it ties into the nature of the function of the border when we consider it as a place where status-functions are applied to people and things.  For just as knowing the river is a border presupposes a number of constitutive background capacities so too for the production of institutional facts at the border. The interesting thing about the border is that it is a place that has a function imposed upon it, but the nature of that function is to impose further status-functions to create institutional realities – i.e. situate things, people and ideas within networks of legitimate meaning.  Another example of this kind would be a court, where a certain building is designated a place where legal statuses can be imposed upon people so that they can be legitimately (because it is the collective will of the people, as in America vs. the plaintive) assigned a status.  The ‘border as regulator’ works in a similar capacity: it selectively regulates the flow of people (amongst other things as will be discussed later) through the imposition of a status-function. 
An example is the status of ‘terrorist suspect.’ Here border guards can, through an illocutionary speech act, impose the institutional function of ‘terrorist suspect’ onto a person who fits a certain number of criteria. The case of Ms. Ghuman, a music scholar who was detained as a terrorist suspect, and subsequently banned from the United States (Bernstein, 2007) is illustrative here.  Although there were clear mistakes in the process that determined her as being a threat to the United States, the status imposed upon her at the border set her within a framework of meaning whereby certain attitudes and ways of treating her became active.  In a written account of her treatment at the border:
‘…officials tore up her H-1B visa, which was valid through May 2008, defaced her British passport, and seemed suspicious of everything from her music cassettes to the fact that she had listed Welsh as a language she speaks’ (ibid).
Her residency visa was revoked and she has been in limbo ever since: although the mistake has been acknowledged by authorities she is still unable to return to the US due to her newly acquired status.  This case shows how the imposition of status-functions in the creation of institutional facts changes the way that person is made sense of, while nothing about her has changed.  The seemingly innocuous fact that she speaks Welsh now takes on significance.  Even her movements were now made sense of in a completely different context, to the extent that Ms. Ghuman was told, while being searched: ‘that if she moved, she would be considered to be attacking her armed female searcher’ (ibid).  Imposing the status-function of ‘terrorist suspect’ on Ms. Ghuman set her within a whole new discursive terrain, undergirded by a number of assumptions. The sticky nature of the institution illustrates the overdetermination of bordering processes: the idea, as observed by Balibar (2004), that what goes on at a particular border can transcend the local. Once Ms. Ghuman had the status-function of suspected terrorist imposed upon her at the border by ‘officials,’ she entered a framework for making sense of people and things that is persistent as long as status is imposed, and is active whenever she enters spaces where the framework holds.  So, this example shows the relationship between the imposition of a status-function to create an institutional fact (terrorist assumption) but also points towards the nexus of background assumptions that are constitutive of both the act and institution itself.  Again, issues of power arise.  In the above example we have an act of power in a particular episode (Clegg, 1989) that rests on a number of viscous assumptions for its efficacy and legitimacy.
However, where does the legitimacy to impose the status-function come from and furthermore, how do these assumptions come about?  The following section argues that legitimacy stems from the reasonable accountability of actions given a background of pre-reflexive understandings of the world.  Just as the truth condition for a sentence is not just correspondence with the state of the world but also a certain appropriateness depending on the situation (Kratochwil, 1989: 30), so the legitimacy of a bordering processes relies on social background assumptions.  In presenting this argument it is shown how ‘doing border-like things’- borderwork - relies on those acts being accountable, that is, socially reasonable.  This does not mean that all border processes have to be socially reasonable, only that when they are not, they must rely on violence in order to ‘stop the discussion’.
Meaningful realities and borders
So far, the concept of background capacities has featured in the discussion, and it has been linked to both the potential for the creation of institutional facts at the border and to power. The background is a set of socialised pre-reflexive, or in Searle’s terms unintentional, understandings that provide the potential for agency (Searle, 1995: chapter 6).  The background, much like Bourdieu’s (1990) notion of habitus, is a set of dispositions acquired through social interactions, which are sensitive to the rule structures of institutions (Searle, 1995: 144).  The background, then, can be seen as the preconditions of making sense of the world.  It allows for the reading of certain situations, lays down expectations and produces the possibility of narrativising events into causal relationships.  
The background is social, intersubjective and assumed to be coherent: the world is experienced from many subjectivities, but does not lead to a chaos where reality breaks down evidenced by the relatively ordered, routine and predictable nature of everyday life (see also Garfinkel, 1967).  We suspend our doubt for pragmatic reasons, and tend to assume that those around us are seeing and experiencing the same world as we are. The practical aspect should be emphasized here - knowledge about the world, and therefore the ability to negotiate it rests on shared assumptions of intersubjectively coherent experience, and it is these assumptions that provide a form of ontological security necessary for practical being in the world (Giddens, 1991).  Our background capacities are based on typifications (Schutz, 1967), which sediment over time to form a framework of familiarity, which is ‘furnished through a presently unquestioned…stock of knowledge at hand.  Even the utterly novel and unfamiliar is grasped against this pre-established background of normality’ (Heritage, 1984: 51).
So, borders and bordering and the dispositions that we acquire towards, gain their validity via background understandings of the mechanisms of social life.  This is the constitutive aspect of power at the border.  Various border institutions have a number of language carried representations that have sedimented to form part of our pre-reflexive background assumptions about borders, towards which we develop practical capacities. An example of this would be the still persuasive image of a border as a wall or fence dividing two states.  It is perhaps in this context that people naturalise the term: when people talk about borders in social settings that might be the intersubjective assumption.  Due to this assumption of what a border is people build a set of background capacities that enable them to make sense of what goes on in the context of bordering.  Again, to use an example, it is because we have some ideas about what a border is that we know to take our passports (a practical capacity).  This is a generally pre-reflexive process: we don't think ‘I am going to a border and at this space a number of processes are set in motion through which I am sorted, and therefore I need a document that has a certain collectively endowed status-function in order to get through the process’. We just know we require a passport.   
 Maintenance of intersubjective background assumptions, however, is not a ‘quiet thing’ (Howarth, 2006: 80).  It is instead a babble of dispute and controversy over the fixing of what constitutes intersubjective social facts, the causal relations they suggest, and the spheres of life they are applicable to.  This is the space in which borderwork exists.  As Kratochwil (1989: 33) argues:
‘…since the basis of validity-claims remains problematic in cases of normative statements, as neither an external check nor internal logical criteria are available to settle “practical” matters unequivocally, the issue of why and how certain “opinions”…become authoritative has to be investigated.  In particular, one has to inquire into the ways in which traditions, historical experiences, past cases, practices, ideologies, etc., provide support for “reasons” that become socially dominant’.  
Other ideas of borders and the legitimacy of the institutional facts they create can go on to unsettle background assumptions. The maintenance and development of certain forms of bordering as taken for granted background assumptions has many normative elements – it concerns what we will take as legitimate or justified in the context of what a particular border can do, what speech acts are legitimate and the extent to which they stick. Thus, analysis extends to both work done to engineer background conditions through for example lobbying and public education, but also how pre-existing background assumptions are used strategically to legitimate and make effective episodes of institutional fact creation at the border. Thus, the way in which the context of the border is conceptualised and contested is critical for it is the context that allows a material thing in the world to take on the status-function of the border, and it is the context that sets the parameters for border functionality.  If in essence the border is a place where status-functions are assigned to people that situate them within a specific set of background capacities, the place of bordering could be widened to include other places: on the streets, in homes, in specially designated areas.  There is no logical reason to preclude the imposition of status-function previously associated with the space of the border to become detached from that space, while still claiming legitimacy from background assumptions about bordering in general. 
Ubiquitous bordering, however, would have to be accompanied by an equal change in the dispositions to bordering in the background, and this would take time. In other words it would be reliant on the reasons given for a particular bordering process having neustic force: neustic here meaning the giving of assent to a statement (Kratochwil, 1989: 32). With continued assenting they become commonsense and fade into the background as non-problematic, suppositional elements of political and social life.  This does not mean they are unassailable, but the achievement of commonsense nature is also the achievement of a form of fixity: a fixity that becomes more ingrained through the enactment of attitudes towards it. Thus there is a distinct temporal element to bordering and as such temporality itself is one aspect of the mechanism of bordering. Political questions to ask here are: how are unquestioned representations of borders resisted or ‘breached’ (Garfinkel, 1967)?  Alternatively, how are they then ‘sutured’ up (Ivy, 1995); and what are the characteristics of strategic use of time periods in relation to constitutive changes in background assumptions that go on to legitimate political claims about both ‘new’ and ‘old’ bordering practices?
Examples Revisited
It can now be argued that the wine produced with certain qualities and within a certain border has acquired the legitimate status-function of Champagne, and a number of general assumptions about Champagne to do with quality and taste have sedimented into the background.  From the perspective of the blind tasters, either bottle could be Champagne. What makes one and not the other is a performative declaration at the site of the test – or an enactment of the border.  This is a linguistic, symbolic act and can be as simple as a recognisable label (a status indicator) or an organiser making an illocutionary speech act.  But importantly it invokes in the observers a perlocutionary reaction that is reliant on a number of background assumptions about what it means to be Champagne.  If the people present had never heard of Champagne then any unveiling, from their subjective perspectives, would mean little.  
Practically, however, the chances of this are quite slim as language carried knowledge of Champagne tend to be all-pervasive and associate it with opulence, taste, social status, and location, which actors have capacities and expectations towards.  The speech act that declares this wine Champagne is thus a strategic use of power, one that takes advantage of pre-given background capacities.  But this does not have to be the case – there is nothing inevitable about the status of Champagne. For example, if the quality of Champagne were to change and new world wines got better, coupled with clever marketing that points this out, background understandings of and capacities towards Champagne may change, even if the border of the region does not.  Work would then have to be done to re-engender positive assumptions about the wine. However, this change in grape growing fortune may result in the quality of Champagne to drop to such an extent, and interest in the region to drop so much, that the border becomes meaningless as maintaining it looses all economic benefit; the process of continuing the adverts, maintaining the background assumption of social life becomes in essence pointless.
Thus, applying the schema argued for throughout this paper we see two inter-related champagne bordering processes.  One is the maintenance of a status function imposed on a certain area of France that makes it ‘the Champagne region’.  The other is the constitutive process of creating the background conditions whereby the status of ‘the Champagne region of France’ allows for the creation of institutional facts  - Champagne – that have the intended perlocutionary effect.  
To formalise this structure we have the following: (a) the champagne border is a placeholder for a number of processes, which (b) involve the creation of institutional facts (champagne wine).  The Champagne region is itself a status-function imposed on a certain region that draws its legitimacy from, among other elements, historical tradition.  Justification for labelling this particular region ‘the Champagne Region’ will draw upon certain argumentative and legitimising strategies that draw upon the elements detailed by Kratochwil above to have neustic force.  Of course the ‘objective fact’ that there is a region in France called Champagne is so firmly ingrained in our commonsense understandings of the world that this form of justification is seldom needed.  Only when these commonsense understandings are breached in some way are they called upon.  Part of the rule governed structure of the institutional fact of the Champagne region of France is that a type of sparkling wine with certain characteristics is made there, and only wine made there can legitimately acquire the status of Champagne Wine (imposing the status of Champagne Wine on this sparkling beverage has neustic force, again for the reasons above).   The status of champagne is imposed on certain types of sparkling wine through a speech act (c).  The label on the bottle is an extension of this speech act – it is a status indicator (Searle, 1995: 119) that stands in for it.  Just as the Champagne region is rule governed, so too is Champagne wine (d).  This is to say that there are generally accepted, commonsensical ways of approaching champagne – pricing, use for status, ways of mixing, occasions for drinking – which, while not codified, in theory could be. These rules are related to our background capacities (e).  We do not internalise rules and we do not follow them unconsciously: instead we develop, learn, background capacities towards an institutional fact.  In this case, sedimented language carried representations of champagne such as advertising, experiences in the company of others, opinions of ‘experts’ (food critics, mixologists, restaurateurs), seeing Champagne consumed by wealthy celebrities on television and so on all contribute to the development of background capacities, or commonsense dispositions, towards Champagne.  But as mentioned above, it is possible that these commonsense dispositions can be breached – a tampering scandal for example – and it would then take work to suture up the background.
The idea that borders will change over time suggests that while physical borders may be historically and socially viscous, representations of borders and meanings attributed to them are inheritably changeable.  What is different about Calais is the presence of non-state actors doing borderwork, such as charitable organisations, INGO’s, and the immigrants themselves, which try to frame the border and set how and in what way it is made visible. Again, this relies upon changes in the background assumptions through which the border as institutional fact is made sense of, thus resulting in a modification of the nature of that social fact and people’s approaches to it. In the case of Calais we are interested in how people (specifically non-state actors) draw upon different socially held resources in order to modify and make reasonable their claims about this particular border. Given the preliminary nature of this example, we acknowledge that the way in which state and non-state actors interact with one another and the specific ramifications of these interactions upon the border in question require further investigation. Nevertheless, in relation to our central aims and arguments, the following processes within the borderwork taking place at Calais is apparent:   
Like the Champagne region of France the border becomes a placeholder (a) within which (b) institutional facts are created and imposed and the visible border. The institutional facts include the labelling (c) of mobile bodies: economically desirable productive bodies, economically undesirable bodies that have non-legitimate claims to welfare, or perspective terrorists that threaten internal order and structure. These labels are rooted in background geopolitical security narratives post 9/11, narratives which in themselves necessarily produce the perception of threat. On this reading border crossers in the context of Calais are placed within specific rules (d) linked to the formation of binary meanings attributed to them - friend/foe, productive/unproductive, honest/dishonest, and so on. The creation of these meanings, therefore, reinforces the dominant commonsense function assigned to the border: the border is required to protect the inside against a very real threat emanating from the outside through rigorous management of people. This in turn narrates the background (e) from which the institutional fact and common sense function of the border derive from the very existence of the state itself: we expect the border to function in this way and act accordingly.    
However the perception of a strong securitized border is countered by representations of the border as inhumane and as a focal point for issues concerning human rights rooted in a background of cosmopolitanism in its idealised sense. Therefore: the border as placeholder becomes a place of negotiation (see Boer, 2006) in which institutional facts are challenged by an array of non-state actors. Borderwork at  Calais attempts to undermine the neustic force of state justifications of the border, as well as that of ‘legitimate’ status functions imposed on those legally and illegally crossing it.  Non-state actors produce their own aggregated neustic force enacted through resistance strategies and political campaigning, at and away from the border, embedded within and seeking to change different background assumptions, or making arguments that reveal the polysemy of bordering practices. This challenge functions due to differing background capacities that produce their own logics of argument and practice: in this case, perceptions of idealised (global) civil society, and alternative media voices and networks distributing imagery of suffering at the border, or simply at the will of state sovereignty in general. 
While the status-function of Champagne is legitimated through performative acts in relation to a constitutive, assumed background - enactments of the border - in this example a particular act indicative of state bordering is being challenged by other normative claims.  Like the previous example, what the border was, is, or becomes, is the result of people setting it within a web of normative claims, teleologies and assumptions. Consequently, the successes and failures of those claims, as well as which actors employ the most neustic force, become relevant, important and necessary within any future study of bordering, or borderwork, in Calais.
Concluding Remarks
This paper argued for an understanding of borders as placeholders for a set of processes.  It argued that there are three components of bordering – the process of imposition of status-functions on people and things to create institutional facts, the context within which that institutional fact is meaningful, and the background assumptions that provide the truth conditions for this process in general terms.  Throughout this paper we have argued for the importance of communication, reasoning and legitimacy in the study of borders.  We have thus suggested a methodology that is both at the border and beyond it, recognizing that for any bordering process to be legitimate it has to rely on a number of other associated conditions.  This final concluding section probes the notion of legitimacy and power a little further, and argues for analytic focus on the discursive logics that confer neustic force to certain accounts of a particular bordering process.
It must be noted, however, that though our approach draws upon linguistic theories of social institutions, it does not rob material objects of a place within the scheme.  We agree with Allen (2007) that material artefacts metaphorically ‘push back’ against the roles we ascribe them.  Artefacts – machines, pieces of technology - designed initially for one reason are not bound in their application to the initial descriptions they fall under.  They are themselves polysemic, but certain restrictions on the descriptions they can fall under are imposed on their use due to their sheer physicality.  This decoupling of technology and intentionality is an important element of analysis.  Technological methods for bordering introduced under one set of legitimising descriptions, once decoupled from their original rationalising logos, can be appropriated, subverted, challenged.  And the makeup of their technical functionality implies reasonable and unreasonable approaches to them, which also form part of the constitution of a bordering practice. So, artefacts, in Latour’s (1992) terms, prescribe. Different physical forms of bordering, and the technologies that are included, will, over time, engender different capacities in actors.
The argument presented has essentially been about the negotiation of inter-subjectively coherent social experiences; the sorts of things that can be done within regimes of understanding and the sorts of things and their associated descriptions that are bracketed off as illegitimate, given the rule structures of the experience.  But different rule structures overlap and as such different ways of thinking about, talking about, and acting towards a border can all claim to have authority, can all be reasonable and thus all have neustic force.  There arises interplay between sources of authority in order to settle the debate, and it is in this space that borderwork takes place.  It has been argued that it is important to grasp that bordering is a practical matter: it is something that is done so as to make sense of and do work in the world. As Kratochwil (1989: 33) argued above, there is no authoritative way to settle practical disputes (see also Billig, 1996; MacIntye, 1962) and therefore one has to inquire into the practices, traditions, past cases, ideologies and historical experiences – the elements constitutive of our background experiences - that are drawn upon by actors when they make their case for a particular use of a border; the establishment of a border; the sorts of statuses that can be conferred at a border and so on.  Violence should not be factored out of the analysis as another source of authority, and it is the state’s continued monopoly over this source that facilitates its own borderwork, but the use of violence is costly and in the case of coercive force relies on surveillance, supervision and punishment (Matheson, 1987).
It should be clear that this argument problematises ideas of top-down or bottom-up bordering from the outset.  If we understand borders, bordering and the statuses that are conferred at the border as being valid only insofar as they are understood as legitimate within certain rule structures, the analysis shifts to how those structures are produced and used. Although it has been argued that status-functions are ‘imposed’ at or on a border, this does not suggest that this imposition is either all-powerful or will have the consequences that such an imposition intended.  It is not all powerful because the status only has meaning within particular regimes of assumed understanding.  It is not deterministic because placing an actor within a framework of rules does not stipulate how those rules can be drawn upon.  The example of Ms. Ghuman showed how a certain status had the effect of taking away a range of reasonable arguments for accounting for herself. But other statuses may open up different forms of argument that give access to different sources of authority that were not accounted for to begin with. Furthermore, the above observations lead to recognition that actors can draw upon variegated sources of legitimacy in order to frame and produce their own borders - borderwork - and set the types of functions that are produced at those sites (and beyond). If the above argument has been towards a ‘thin’ concept of the border, the tools and processes of analysis outlined here can also be employed to ‘thicken out’ any particular case.  It is hoped this paper has provided some stable ground from which to do so.
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